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Thomas v. Hardwick,1
EVIDENCE: VOIR DIRE, HABIT EVIDENCE, SANCTIONS FOR 
SPOILATION, & TESTIMONY CONCERNING RECALL BIAS 
 126 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 16 (May 27, 2010) 
Summary 
 A multi-faceted appeal from jury verdict entered in favor of defense in wrongful 
death suit.  
Disposition/Outcome 
 The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s ruling.  
Facts and Procedural History 
On January 13, 2003, Jesse “Ray” Thomas [“Ray”] received emergency treatment 
at WMC after complaining of chest pains and sweatiness.  Ray was never admitted to 
WMC.  Two weeks later, Ray was stricken with a fatal heart attack.  The testimony of the 
hospital workers and Ray’s family differs drastically as to what happened during the 
hospital visit.  Dr. Hardwick and the attending nurse both testified that Dr. Hardwick 
urged Jesse to remain in the hospital’s care for observation and testing to rule out cardio 
vascular disease, but Jesse refused.  However, Jesse never signed an AMA (Against 
Medical Advice) form, which Dr. Hardwick requested be signed.   
Bobbie Thomas (“Thomas”), the wife of the deceased, testified that Dr. Hardwick 
told Ray that his preliminary tests results were good enough for him to go home.  
Another family member testified that Ray stated, with Dr. Hardwick present, that the 
doctor had told him he was lucky and could leave safely. 
After hearing the conflicting testimony and evidence, the jury found no 
negligence on the part of Dr. Hardwick.  The subject appeal followed. 
A. Voir Dire 
Thomas filed a motion in limine for an order to exclude all references to Tort 
Reform or the “Keep our Doctors in Nevada” initiative.  After opposing counsel filed 
statements of non-oppositon, Thomas filed a reply to request the exclusion of voir dire 
questioning from the order.  The issue was discussed at subsequent pre trial conferences 
where the judge concluded that general questions about an individual’s opinion of 
malpractice suits were appropriate.  However, the judge never made a definitive written 
order.  Rather, the judge instructed counsel to submit questions and/or request a sidebar at 
trial if something questionable needed to be asked.  Nonetheless, Thomas’s counsel never 
submitted any proposed voir dire questions about medical malpractice reform. 
                                                 
1 By Amanda Hogeg. 
Responsibility to assemble a record with voir dire transcripts rests on the 
Appellant and where unavailable will “hamstring” the court’s review.2
While the right to voir dire is protected by statute,
  Without a 
transcript, courts will presume that the venire included questions the court suggested, 
related questions proposed by opposing counsel and related follow-up.   
3 the scope of such will be 
within the discretion of the district court.4  Cases in other jurisdictions held that 
procedures similar to those instituted by the district court judge in this case, were 
appropriate.5  For example, in Barrett v. Peterson, the plaintiffs lodged specific 
advertisements highlighting tort reform and submitted eighty-two proposed voir dire 
questions, eleven of which asked specific questions about the ads.6  On appeal, after the 
trial court prohibited all questions even referencing “the concept of lawsuits against 
doctors,” the Utah appellate court found this to be error.7  In contrast, the Idaho Supreme 
Court concluded, in Kozlowski v. Rush, questions concerning an individual’s attitudes 
towards medical malpractice claims would have been proper had they been correctly 
documented.8  Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that when a transcript is 
unavailable, general questioning about sentiment towards medical malpractice was 
sufficient to fulfill the parties’ request concerning the prospective jurors’ sentiments 
about civil damages.9
Here, there was no abuse of discretion because Thomas failed to offer any proof 
that the prospective jurors were exposed to the subject ads concerning tort reform, nor did 
Thomas take any action to submit questions of her own.  As the court noted, a trial 
court’s failure to ask specific questions regarding these ads, after counsel chose not to do 
so, is “hardly an abuse of discretion.”
   
10
 
  
B. Habit Evidence 
 
 Dr. Hardwick, who worked in WMC’s emergency room since 1980, testified that 
while he does not remember the encounter with Ray, he routinely urges patients with 
chest pain and inconclusive test results, like Ray’s to be admitted and that he routinely 
records these recommendations in hospital records, as was done in this case.  In addition, 
the attending nurse testified that after twelve years of working with Dr. Hardwick, he 
“admits everyone” with symptoms such as Ray’s.  At trial, counsel for Thomas objected 
to the habit evidence.  Thomas now claims that the evidence should not have been 
admitted under NRS 48.059(1), however, the Nevada Supreme Court found no error. 
                                                 
2 Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007); see also 
Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 182, 808 P.2d 535, 538 (1991) (reversed on other grounds in Riggins v. 
Nev., 504 U.S. 127 (1992).   
3 See NEVADA REVISED STATUTES 16.030(6) (2007).  
4 Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 1354-55, 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006). 
5 The Nevada Supreme Court refused to adopt Maryland’s approach as espoused in Landon v. Zorn, 884 
A.2d 142 (Md. 2005) and relied upon by the Appellants because of the differences between the use of voir 
dire in Maryland and Nevada. 
6 868 P.2d 96, 97, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).  
7 Id. at 96, 103.  
8 828 P.2d 854, 862-63 (Idaho 1992), 
9 Wytiaz v. Deitrick, 954 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008). 
10 Chlopek v. Fed. Ins. Co. 499 F.3d 692, 702 (7th Cit. 2007). 
 In admitting habit evidence, there is a significant concern that such evidence will 
lead to a finding of propensity to act in conformity with character, which violates NRS 
48.045, and possibly causes unfair prejudice to the opposing party.11    Thus, to admit 
“habit evidence, the proponent of such evidence must lay the proper foundation showing 
specific, recurring stimuli which produce the same specific response often and 
consistently enough to depict a habit.”12  Many jurisdictions allow evidence of a medical 
practitioner’s routine to be admitted as relevant to what the individual did on a specific 
occasion.13  Moreover, trial courts are given considerable discretion in determining 
whether evidence may be admitted or relevant.14
 Here, Dr. Hardwick’s notations concerning his consultation with Ray properly 
served as evidence of habit or routine and it was not an abuse of discretion to allow this 
into evidence, as it was relevant to the trial court’s determination of negligence.  
Additionally, even though corroboration is no longer required under Nevada law, the 
attending nurse and the notes fully corroborated Dr. Hardwick’s testimony.  Thus, Dr. 
Hardwick’s testimony indicating that it was his habit to counsel patients to stay overnight 
was relevant and admissible. 
   
 
C.  Sanctions for Lost Original Chart 
 
 A trial court’s decision regarding whether or not to impose sanctions for 
spoliation or destruction of evidence rests within its discretion.15
 Similar to this case, in Allen Pen. Co. v. Springfield Photo Mount Co., one party 
requested a preclusion order or an adverse inference instruction because of the opposing 
party’s destruction of its evidence.
    In this case, Dr. 
Hardwick initially produced a copy of the original chart which Thomas never objected to 
until two weeks before an already continued trial.  At that point, the chart had been 
scanned to an electronic file and the hard copy was presumably disposed of.  Prior to 
Thomas’ objection, the first copy had been authenticated on numerous occasions during 
depositions.  The trial court ruled that Thomas could raise this issue at trial and that 
Thomas could question WMC’s records custodian, but she could not use an adverse 
inference. 
16  Rather than immediately requesting the original 
documents, the sanctions proponent did not raise the issue until right before trial.  In 
relying on public policy, the First Circuit concluded that a parties failure to seek lesser 
remedies at an earlier point in time is grounds to bar more severe sanctions requested on 
the eve of trial.17
 It was not an abuse of discretion to limit the sanctions in this case because the 
original chart was copied early on in discovery, all parties accepted the authenticity of 
this copy, and Thomas failed to demonstrate that the copy was not the exact duplicate of 
the original.  In fact, Thomas was given the opportunity to pursue the issue of whether 
   
                                                 
11 Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Sys., Inc., 847 F.2d 1290, 1293 (7th Cir. 1988). 
12 1 McCormick on Evidence § 195 at 784 (6th ed. 2006). 
13 Aikman v. Kanda, 975 A.2d 152, 164 (D.C. 2009).   
14 Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1127, 923 P.2d 1119, 1123 (1996) (overruled on other grounds by 
McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 (2004)). 
15 Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 442, 447, 134, P.3d 103, 106 (2006). 
16 653 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1981), 
17 Id.; see also JOM, Inc. v. Adell Plastics, Inc., 193 F.3d 47, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1999). 
any information was falsified, yet Thomas rejected that option.  Thus, the district court’s 
rulings on sanctions was proper as to WMC’s negligent loss of the original chart. 
 
D. Expert Testimony/ Recall Bias 
 
Thomas objected to Dr. Panacek’s testimony concerning recall bias, however, the 
Court rejected this proposition for two reasons.  First, Thomas failed to argue this at trial.  
Second, even if the trial court erred, Dr. Panacek’s testimony did not rise to the level 
requiring reversal.  
Recall bias refers to a tendency, when confronted with an unusual event, “to recall 
with greater frequency or clarity events which may explain the outcome.”18 Testimony 
about recall bias has only been used in the epidemiological context and never in 
discussing individual witness credibility as it likely invades the province of the jury.19
Although Thomas’s omnibus motion in limine contained an objection to Dr. 
Panacek’s testimony, counselnever reaffirmed the objection at trial, which is required by 
the contemporaneous objection rule.
   
20
NRS 47.040(1)(a) requires that in order for a party to preserve an issue for appeal, 
the party must timely object “stating the specific ground of objection.”
 In fact, Thomas allowed Dr. Panacek to testify for 
five pages at trial until opposing counsel asked whether recall bias existed in the 
particular case.  After Thomas admitted to the judge that the general recall bias 
questioning was not objectionable, the judge ruled in favor of Thomas as to the specific 
questions about the case. 
21  This rule is 
applicable even when a party raises an objection to certain evidence but not to other 
related evidence that, as confirmed by the record, was a deliberate choice to leave out.22 
While there is not much of a difference between general questions about recall bias and 
case-specific questions, Thomas failed to object to the latter, and is thus barred from 
raising this argument.  As such, because an error in allowing general testimony to be 
admitted cannot amount to a plain error, the court’s decision will not be affected.23
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
18  Hendrix v. Evenflo Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 568, 601 n.62 (N.D. Fla. 2009).   
19 Nichols v. Amer. Nat’l Ins. Co., 154 F.3d 875, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1998). 
20 See Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 929-32, 59 P.3d 1249, 1252-54 (2002); NEVADA REVISED 
STATUTES 47.040(1) (2007).   
21 Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 782, 795 n.28, 138 P.3d 477, 486 n.28 (2006).   
22 1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 
103.02[9], at 103-18 (9th ed. 2006). 
23 See Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 16, 174 P.3d 970, 980 (2008); NRS 47.040(2); see also United States v. 
Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (2d Cir. 1995) (a decision not to raise an objection for strategic reasons 
amounts to waiver, not merely forfeiture, and is not reviewable even for plain error) (discussing United 
States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)) 
Cherry, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
 
A. Expert Testimony/ Recall Bias 
 
 Justice Cherry disagreed with the majority’s decision regarding recall bias 
because of Thomas’s multiple objections and the critical nature of the testimony.  
 Justice Cherry reasoned that Thomas objected on at least four occasions.  First, 
the motion in limine specifically addressed the recall bias issue, and thus was a sufficient 
objection.  Thereafter, Thomas objected at the pretrial conference, where the court 
deferred ruling until trial.  Again, Thomas objected a trial before Dr. Panacek was called, 
explicitly referring to the recall bias testimony to the judge.  The judge deferred ruling 
until her heard the testimony, and once the testimony became case specific, Thomas 
objected for the fourth time.  Finally, during a colloquy based on the fourth objection, 
Thomas objected again stating that “only plaintiffs have any recall in this case[, e]ven the 
general information is prejudicial [and] without probative value.” 
 At the very least, Thomas’ third objection constituted the necessary 
contemporaneous objection to have preserved the issue for appeal. Based on these facts 
and the fact that repeated objections often alienate the juryit was unclear what Thomas 
should have done.In fact, Thomas’s predicament was difficult enough that even the 
district court believed the issue had been preserved for appeal. 
 Accordingly, Justce Cherry concluded that the district court erred in allowing 
recall bias testimony and this error was not harmless as a different result reasonably 
might have been reached.  Such is the case particularly when liability turns on a single 
question of witness credibility, where, as here, an expert on recall bias could effectively 
have changed the entire course of trial.  Because the district court abused its discretion in 
allowing this testimony to go forward, Justice Cherry dissented and would have reversed 
and remanded for a new trial free of any reference to recall bias. 
 
Conclusion 
 In summation, the Nevada Supreme Court rejected all of the movant’s bases for 
appeal.  In doing so, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
prohibiting specific questioning about medical malpractice tort reform when the 
proponent of such questioning failed to submit any proposed questions and did not 
properly document voir dire in its appeal.  In addition, it was not an abuse of discretion to 
admit evidence of a medical practitioner’s routine in recording his consultations with 
patients and the typical advice given in common circumstances.  Thirdly, severe 
sanctions for spoliation of evidence is not necessary when the adverse party fails to raise 
the issue of authenticity until trial is nearing and when the adverse party is unable to point 
to any proof of falsification.  Finally, in order to preserve an issue for appeal, the party 
must object at trial, and not merely in a motion.  If the objection relates to a different, but 
related, evidentiary matter it will not preserve the related issue. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA 
  
No. 48329 
  
BOBBIE THOMAS, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF 
THE ESTATE OF JESSE RAY THOMAS; AND BRANDI LIN THOMAS, 
Appellants, 
    vs. 
WAYNE HARDWICK, M.D.; NORTHERN NEVADA EMERGENCY ROOM 
PHYSICIANS; AND WASHOE MEDICAL CENTER, 
Respondents. 
  
            Appeal from a district court judgment on a jury verdict in a wrongful death 
action.  Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County; Janet J. Berry, Judge. 
            Affirmed. 
            CHERRY, J., dissented in part. 
  
Osborne, Ohlson & Hall, Chtd., and Ann O. Hall and John Ohlson, Reno, for Appellants. 
Lemons Grundy & Eisenberg and Alice Campos Mercado, Reno, for Respondents 
Hardwick and Northern Nevada Emergency Room Physicians. 
Piscevich & Fenner and Margo Piscevich, Reno, for Respondent Washoe Medical Center. 
Burris, Thomas & Springberg and Andrew Thomas, Las Vegas, for Amicus Curiae 
Nevada Justice Association. 
  
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. 
  
OPINION 
  
By the Court, PICKERING, J.: 
            Bobbie Thomas appeals from a judgment entered on a defense verdict in her 
wrongful death suit against Dr. Wayne Hardwick, his practice group, and Washoe 
Medical Center.  Her suit alleges that medical malpractice led to her husband’s 
preventable heart attack and death two weeks after Dr. Hardwick saw him for chest pain 
complaints in WMC’s emergency room.  On appeal, Thomas asserts that errors by the 
trial court in managing voir dire, admitting certain evidence, and not imposing 
meaningful sanctions on WMC for its negligent loss of evidence deprived her of a fair 
trial.  Separately, she appeals the trial court’s dismissal on statute-of-limitations grounds 
of the amended complaint by which her daughter, Brandi, sought to join the suit as an 
additional named plaintiff. 
            Not all the errors claimed are properly before this court.  Those that are permit 
reversal and a new trial only if an abuse of discretion affecting substantial rights is 
shown.  Because that showing has not been made, we affirm. 
I. 
            Jesse “Ray” Thomas had undetected, advanced-stage coronary artery disease.  On 
January 13, 2003, two weeks before his fatal heart attack, he went to WMC’s emergency 
room, complaining of chest pains and sweatiness.  The electrocardiogram and troponin 
tests Dr. Hardwick ran ruled out recent heart attack but not cardiovascular disease as the 
cause of his symptoms.  The core question at trial was what Dr. Hardwick told Mr. 
Thomas when he saw him in the emergency room on January 13.  Did Ray Thomas leave 
the hospital that day against medical advice, as respondents WMC and Dr. Hardwick 
maintain?  Or was Ray Thomas told he was “fit as a fiddle” and could safely leave, as 
appellant Bobbie Thomas maintains? 
             The evidence at trial was that Ray Thomas’s heart disease may have been 
treatable if it had been diagnosed earlier.  The tests run in the emergency room did not 
rule out cardiovascular disease, which Mr. Thomas’s chest pains and other symptoms 
suggested he might have.  The standard of care required Dr. Hardwick to counsel Mr. 
Thomas to agree to be admitted to the hospital for observation and testing, especially 
since Mr. Thomas’s history disclosed he had no regular primary care physician. 
            A copy of Mr. Thomas’s hospital chart was authenticated in discovery and used at 
trial.[1]  The chart reflects that he left the emergency room on January 13, 2003, against 
medical advice or “AMA.”  It contains an order by Dr. Hardwick directing hospital staff 
to ask Mr. Thomas to sign an AMA release, but no signed release was ever produced.  
Dr. Hardwick sees thousands of patients each year and could not recall Mr. Thomas 
specifically.  Based on his dictated chart notes and customary practice in treating chest 
pain patients, Dr. Hardwick testified that he urged Mr. Thomas to be admitted for 
observation and testing but he refused.  An attending nurse gave similar testimony about 
her handwritten chart notes, which said the patient was “refusing to be admitted.  M.D. 
aware.” 
            Bobbie Thomas disputed this evidence.  She testified that she came to the 
emergency room with her husband and sat in on his conversations with Dr. Hardwick.  
She remembered Dr. Hardwick saying that, while he normally urged chest pain patients 
to be admitted, her husband’s preliminary test results were good enough for him to go 
home, so long as he followed up promptly with a private physician.  A family member 
arrived as the Thomases were preparing to leave.  He recalled Ray Thomas saying, within 
earshot of Dr. Hardwick, who said nothing, that the doctor had told him he was lucky and 
could safely leave. 
            Mr. Thomas’s symptoms subsided before he left the emergency room.  Hospital 
staff gave the Thomases papers suggesting he follow up with a personal physician and 
return to the emergency room immediately if his chest pains recurred or he experienced 
unusual sweating or problems breathing.  One form warned that chest pain could indicate 
a life-threatening condition; another provided names and addresses of follow-up health 
care options.  A fellow worker testified that Mr. Thomas complained about not feeling 
well the day before his fatal heart attack.  However, Mr. Thomas did not seek further 
medical care after leaving the emergency room beyond calling several physicians’ offices 
to ask about possible care. 
            Trial lasted five days.  The parties presented a number of witnesses, including 
experts.  After deliberating for less than two hours, the jury returned a unanimous verdict 
finding no negligence. 
II. 
A.  Voir dire 
            Thomas’s first assignment of error concerns voir dire about tort reform.  The 
ruling Thomas complains about originated in an omnibus motion in limine that Thomas 
herself filed.  In it, Thomas moved for an order prohibiting “[a]ny and all reference, 
mention or citation to Tort Reform or ‘Keep our Doctors in Nevada’” on the grounds 
these “are highly politicized topics . . . which do not have any bearing upon the ultimate 
issues in this trial.”[2]  Both WMC and Dr. Hardwick filed statements of nonopposition, 
agreeing with Thomas.  Correcting her motion, Thomas filed a short reply asking to carve 
voir dire out of her proposed order in limine regarding tort reform.[3] 
            The issue came up briefly at the first of two pretrial conferences.  At the 
conference, WMC offered the view that, “If [Thomas’s lawyers] want to ask [prospective 
jurors] generally, do you have a problem in a malpractice case, do you believe that people 
can legitimately bring a malpractice case[ ], . . . I don’t have a problem with it.”  But, 
WMC argued, “it’s totally inappropriate to ask somebody how they voted on a 
referendum, and what they thought about the Keep our Doctors in Nevada 
referendum.”[4]  The district court partially agreed, cautioning the lawyers that it did not 
“want references to voting, to tort reform, [or] to Keep our Doctors in Nevada” in general 
voir dire.  However, this was neither the blanket prohibition nor definitive ruling Thomas 
makes it out to be.  The district court urged the lawyers instead to 
. . . [g]et it closer to the facts of this case.  Do you have any strong feelings 
one way or the other about people who sue their doctor or their hospital 
and the claim that the doctor and the hospital caused them injury, the 
damage[?]  Anybody who, for whatever reason in their life would not be 
able to be fair and impartial and listen to all the testimony[?]  Those types 
of questions are fine. 
By prior order, the district court had deferred final ruling on voir dire about medical 
malpractice reform “until filing of pre-trial statements and proposed voir dire questions.”  
She reiterated that her final ruling would depend on the specific voir dire questions the 
lawyers proposed in their written pretrial statements: 
. . . if there’s some questions that you feel are important to the fact pattern, 
if you put them in your pretrial statement . . . I will read those, and then 
we can talk about them or modify them as the Court might deem 
necessary. 
The judge also invited sidebars at trial: “[I]f something comes up in jury selection, and 
any of you feel that there’s a burning question that has to be asked that’s a little bit 
broader, a little more political, ask for a sidebar, and we can talk about it.” 
            This is all there is in the record on voir dire.  No final written order was entered, 
the voir dire wasn’t transcribed, and the appendix does not include the pretrial statements 
or any proposed written voir dire.  The record contains no copies of advertisements or 
literature about medical malpractice tort reform, to which the venire might have been 
exposed, or proof of when and to what extent such literature was disseminated.  At oral 
argument, Thomas’s counsel acknowledged that she did not prepare and submit any 
proposed voir dire questions concerning medical malpractice reform, despite the district 
court’s request for them. 
            Appellant has the responsibility to order the transcripts and assemble the record 
needed to decide the issues raised on appeal.  Cuzze v. Univ. & Cmty. Coll. Sys. of Nev., 
123 Nev. 598, 603, 172 P.3d 131, 135 (2007) (citing NRAP 30(b)(3)).  Not having voir 
dire transcripts hamstrings our review.  See Riggins v. State, 107 Nev. 178, 182, 808 P.2d 
535, 538 (1991), reversed on other grounds Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992) 
(declining to review an order refusing sequestered voir dire when the relevant transcripts 
were not ordered; if “the record on appeal . . . [does not] contain[ ] the material to which 
[the objecting party takes] exception . . . , the missing portions . . . are presumed to 
support the district court’s decision”).  Adhering to Riggins, we presume that the venire 
was asked the question the district court suggested (“Do you have any strong feelings one 
way or the other about people who sue their doctor or their hospital and the claim that the 
doctor and the hospital caused them injury?”), the related questions defense counsel 
suggested (“[D]o you have a problem in a malpractice case?”; “[D]o you believe that 
people can legitimately bring a malpractice case[ ]?”), and all appropriate follow-up. 
            In Nevada, the right to attorney voir dire is secured by statute.  NRS 16.030(6), 
discussed in Whitlock v. Salmon, 104 Nev. 24, 752 P.2d 210 (1988).  The scope of voir 
dire nonetheless “rests within the sound discretion of the district court, whose decision 
will be given considerable deference by this court.”  Johnson v. State, 122 Nev. 1344, 
1354-55, 148 P.3d 767, 774 (2006).  Cases elsewhere have taken varying positions on 
whether, to what extent, and when voir dire on tort reform and/or “the insurance crisis” is 
proper.  See Richard L. Ruth, Annotation, Propriety of Inquiry on Voir Dire as to Juror’s 
Attitude Toward, or Acquaintance With, Literature Dealing With, Amount of Damage 
Awards, 63 A.L.R. 5th 285 § 8 (1998 & Supp. 2010).  The Utah, Idaho, and Pennsylvania 
cases on which Thomas relies do not license unlimited voir dire on medical malpractice 
reform, however.  On the contrary, they support the parameters the district court set in 
this case—asking for specific questions to be submitted and justified, offering individual 
or even sequestered voir dire, and asking that the parties first explore jurors’ general 
views on people who sue hospitals or doctors rather than framing the issue initially in 
political terms.  These are all measures Thomas’s cases permit, even encourage.[5] 
            Consider Barrett v. Peterson, 868 P.2d 96 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), for example.  
There, the plaintiffs lodged specific advertisements disseminated recently in the trial 
venue touting “tort-reform” and submitted 82 specific proposed voir dire questions, 11 of 
which were designed to elicit whether the venire had seen the ads and if so, what their 
feelings about them were.  Id. at 97, 101.  The trial court refused to permit these 
questions or, indeed, to allow the parties to even “verbalize the concept of lawsuits 
against doctors prompting discernible emotions.”  Id. at 103.  This complete ban, the 
Utah court of appeals properly held, was error.  Id. at 96. 
            In Kozlowski v. Rush, 828 P.2d 854 (Idaho 1992), by contrast, the plaintiffs failed 
to make a record that the jury venire likely had been exposed to assertedly widespread, 
current, but undocumented advertisements about a “medical malpractice crisis.”  Id. at 
862-63.  Had such exposure been documented, questions concerning individual juror’s 
attitudes could have been appropriate.  Id.[6]  Since reversal was ordered for unrelated 
reasons, the court told the plaintiff to lay a proper foundation if she wished to explore 
attitudes toward malpractice reform on retrial.  Id. 
            And the Pennsylvania case of Capoferri v. CHOP, 893 A.2d 133 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2006), was clarified in Wytiaz v. Deitrick, 954 A.2d 643 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008).  There, as 
here, the voir dire transcript was not available, but the record suggested that the trial 
judge planned to ask the venire for its opinions on civil damage suits and people who sue 
or are sued in medical malpractice cases.  Deitrick, 954 A.2d at 647.  Given that the 
potential jurors were asked “whether they had any specific beliefs about medical 
malpractice lawsuits or the parties involved in such litigation,” id. at 648, the appellants’ 
complaint that they didn’t get the specific phraseology they wanted failed.  Also 
significant in Wytiaz: the appellants “do not assert that they were prevented from 
questioning further any potential juror who answered one or more of the standard voir 
dire questions in a manner which might prompt additional inquiry.”  Id. 
            Based on the actual record, as distinguished from the parties’ speculative 
characterizations of it, we find no abuse of discretion.  Presumably, the district judge 
asked the venire the questions she said she planned to ask about “people who sue their 
doctor or their hospital and the claim that the doctor and the hospital caused them 
injury.”  Since Thomas did not submit any specific voir dire questions or have voir dire 
transcribed, we have no way of knowing whether the district court would have allowed 
the related question of whether the venire had been exposed to media on the subject of 
“people who sue their doctor or their hospital,” assuming an adequate predicate was laid. 
 See supra note 6.  On this record, we assume the court did.  What is presented, then, is a 
challenge to the district court’s “failure to formulate more detailed questions on its own,” 
after counsel declined—“hardly an abuse of discretion.”  Chlopek v. Federal Ins. Co., 499 
F.3d 692, 702 (7th Cir. 2007). 
B.  Habit evidence 
            Dr. Hardwick testified that he has worked in WMC’s emergency room since 
1980, through which approximately 70,000 patients pass each year.  This works out to 
200 patients a day of which, on average, one patient a day presents with chest pain 
complaints.  While Dr. Hardwick did not remember seeing Ray Thomas on January 13, 
2003, his hospital chart was in evidence.  Dr. Hardwick testified to what the chart 
recorded, including his dictated notes stating that he urged Mr. Thomas to be admitted for 
further tests but Mr. Thomas refused.  Over objection, Dr. Hardwick testified that he 
routinely urges patients with chest pain complaints and inconclusive test results like Mr. 
Thomas’s to be admitted and that he routinely records this advice in dictation, as he did 
here.  The attending emergency room nurse gave similar testimony about her handwritten 
chart notes.  She testified without separate objection that in the 12 years she had worked 
with Dr. Hardwick in the emergency room, he “admits everyone” who presents with 
symptoms like Mr. Thomas’s. 
            Thomas challenges the district court’s admission of this evidence, citing NRS 
48.059(1), but does not cogently establish error.  NRS 48.059(1) provides that 
[e]vidence of the habit of a person or the routine practice of an 
organization, whether corroborated or not and regardless of the presence 
of eyewitnesses, is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity with the habit or 
routine practice.[7] 
Like many courts, “[w]e are cautious in permitting the admission of habit or pattern-of-
conduct evidence under [NRS 48.059 or its federal analogue] Rule 406 because it 
necessarily engenders the very real possibility that such evidence will be used to establish 
a party’s propensity to act in conformity with its general character,” in violation of NRS 
48.045, and may involve “collateral inquiries [that] threaten the orderly conduct of trial 
while potentially coloring the central inquiry and unfairly prejudicing the party against 
whom they are directed.”  Simplex, Inc. v. Diversified Energy Systems, Inc., 847 F.2d 
1290, 1293 (7th Cir. 1988).  Nonetheless, NRS 48.059(1) deems evidence of habit or 
routine relevant and admissible to prove an act in conformity with the habit or routine, 
provided an adequate foundation is laid.  For a general discussion of the different 
legislative approaches to habit evidence see 1 McCormick on Evidence § 195 (6th ed. 
2006).  The foundation requires that specific, recurring stimuli have produced the same 
specific response often and invariably enough to qualify as habit or routine.  Id. § 195, at 
784. 
            “Courts in many jurisdictions have allowed evidence of a medical practitioner’s 
routine practice as evidence relevant to what the practitioner did on a particular 
occasion.”  Aikman v. Kanda, 975 A.2d 152, 164 (D.C. 2009) (collecting cases); see 
Annotation, Propriety, in Medical Malpractice Case, of Admitting Testimony Regarding 
Physician’s Usual Custom or Habit in Order to Establish Nonliability, 10 A.L.R. 4th 
1243 (1981).  Proof that Dr. Hardwick, when confronted with an emergency room patient 
experiencing unexplained chest pains of nonmuscular origin, routinely counsels the 
patient to be admitted to the hospital for observation and further testing was relevant, as 
was his habit of dictating multiple chart notes over the course of a patient’s visit to the 
emergency room.  This was legitimate circumstantial evidence that, consistent with Dr. 
Hardwick’s routine, he counseled Mr. Thomas to be admitted to the hospital, as his 
dictated notes record.  See Bloskas v. Murray, 646 P.2d 907, 911 (Colo. 1982). 
            “Trial courts have considerable discretion in determining the relevance and 
admissibility of evidence.”  Atkins v. State, 112 Nev. 1122, 1127, 923 P.2d 1119, 1123 
(1996), overruled on other grounds by McConnell v. State, 120 Nev. 1043, 102 P.3d 606 
(2004).  Although NRS 48.059(1) dispenses with the one-time common law requirement 
of corroboration, the fact the chart notes corroborate Dr. Hardwick’s testimony as to his 
habit and routine makes Thomas’s challenge to his testimony an especially hard sell.  
Much of Dr. Hardwick’s testimony dealt with the chart notes as past recollection 
recorded evidence under NRS 51.125(2).  To the extent Dr. Hardwick matched his 
recorded notes to the habit or routine they were shorthand for, the district court did not 
abuse its discretion in this case in admitting the testimony under NRS 48.059(1).  Atkins, 
112 Nev. at 1127, 923 P.2d at 1123 (reversal based on error in the admission or exclusion 
of evidence inappropriate absent “clear abuse” of discretion). 
C.  Sanctions for lost original chart 
            Thomas next challenges the district court’s refusal to impose preclusive or other 
significant sanctions on WMC for its negligence in having lost the original paper version 
of the emergency room chart.  “[A] trial court’s decision on whether to impose 
sanctions—including an adverse inference instruction—for the destruction or spoliation 
of evidence, is committed to the trial court’s discretion.”  Bass-Davis v. Davis, 122 Nev. 
442, 447, 134 P.3d 103, 106 (2006). 
[I]f the district court, in rendering its discretionary ruling on whether to 
give an adverse inference instruction [or to impose other sanctions] “has 
examined the relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, 
utilizing a [demonstrably] rational process, reached a conclusion that a 
reasonable judge could reach,” affirmance is appropriate. 
Id. at 447-48, 134 P.3d at 106 (quoting Garfoot v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 599 N.W.2d 
411, 416 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999)). 
            Some background helps give context to the sanctions dispute.  Everyone, 
including Thomas, recognized the importance of the emergency room chart.  Thomas 
obtained a copy of the chart from WMC before discovery and produced it at the early 
case conference.  In the early case conference report, the parties agreed to Bates-number 
and use Thomas’s copy of the chart as a master exhibit.  In deposition, the individuals 
who made entries to the chart authenticated them.  Although Thomas served requests for 
production on WMC that, if enforced, would have called for WMC to produce the 
original chart for inspection and fresh copying, to which WMC responded, no inspection 
occurred and no motion to compel was ever filed.  The first firm trial date was continued 
to accommodate a conflict in Thomas’s expert’s calendar.  Before the continuance, all 
parties had advised the court they were prepared to proceed with trial. 
            Just two weeks before the already-continued trial was set to begin, Thomas filed a 
motion to strike the defendants’ pleadings and/or to exclude the master exhibit copy of 
the chart as evidence at trial.  Thomas based her motion on an exchange of letters 
between WMC’s and Thomas’s lawyers, sent after discovery closed and the original trial 
had been continued, in which Thomas asked to see the original paper chart and WMC 
said it searched but could not find it.  WMC attested to its practice of creating an 
electronic copy of its emergency room chart entries by scanning them at the end of each 
day.  The hospital still had the electronic copies of the chart notes for January 13, 2003.  
Its risk manager had compared them to the original paper chart in 2005 when he verified 
WMC’s answers to Thomas’s interrogatories and said the copies were the same. 
            At the hearing that followed, the court offered Thomas a trial continuance to 
develop what it deemed the speculative assertion that the paper original might differ from 
the master exhibit copy.  Thomas declined the offered continuance.  Over WMC’s 
objection, the court ruled that Thomas could raise WMC’s loss of the paper original as an 
issue at trial and, to facilitate that, ordered WMC to make its records custodian available 
to Thomas as a trial witness.  Beyond these measures, the court denied further relief.  The 
court based its decision on the fact that WMC had provided Thomas with a copy of the 
original chart early on; Thomas’s delay in raising the issue, which the court took to mean 
Thomas herself saw no need to double check the master exhibit copy against the original; 
and the prejudice and confusion any other sanction would cause to WMC’s co-defendant, 
Dr. Hardwick, who had never had custody of the original paper chart. 
            The district court did not abuse its discretion in declining preclusion sanctions and 
the adverse inference instruction Thomas proposed.  The court in Allen Pen Co. v. 
Springfield Photo Mount Co., 653 F.2d 17, 23 (1st Cir. 1981), faced similar competing 
policy concerns.  In Allen Pen, one party sought a preclusion order and/or adverse 
inference instruction based on its opponent’s destruction of certain documents after 
consulting them to answer interrogatories.  Id.  Unlike this case, where the chart was 
copied and the copies authenticated before the paper original was lost, no duplicates 
survived in Allen Pen (though the information could have been re-created in discovery 
from third parties).  Id.  As here, the sanctions proponent did not push to see the original 
documents or bring the matter to the trial court’s attention until just before trial and then 
sought what amounted to liability-determining sanctions and/or an adverse inference 
instruction.  Id.  The district court denied the motion and the court of appeals affirmed. 
 Id. at 23-24.  It held that, under the circumstances, the sanctions proponent “seeks far too 
draconian a sanction. . . .  Having failed to seek lesser remedies, it cannot wait for trial 
and then seek close to a declaration of victory on the issue.”  Id. at 23; see JOM, Inc. v. 
Adell Plastics, Inc., 193 F.3d 47, 49-50 (1st Cir. 1999) (upholding order denying 
sanctions for destroyed evidence where the proponent delayed raising the issue until the 
eve of trial); Gault v. Nabisco Biscuit Co., 184 F.R.D. 620, 622 (D. Nev. 1999) (a party 
who waits an unreasonable period of time before moving to enforce discovery waives 
enforcement remedies). 
            This case presents a stronger case against reversal for failure to impose adequate 
sanctions than either Allen Pen or Bass-Davis.  Here, the original chart was copied early 
on.  All parties accepted the copy as authentic. Thomas offered no evidence, only 
argument, to suggest the stipulated master exhibit copy was not an exact duplicate of the 
paper original; no motion to compel inspection of the original was made; Thomas, as the 
sanctions proponent, was not forced to trial minus otherwise unavailable evidence.  As 
the trial court found, all parties, including Thomas, had agreed from the beginning that 
the master exhibit copy was authentic and Thomas had nothing to say it wasn’t.  Compare 
Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, 106 Nev. 88, 92, 787 P.2d 777, 779 (1990) (sanctions 
proponent proved the evidence had been materially altered, making it fair to assume other 
undetected alterations had occurred; with the “original” effectively unavailable, claim-
terminating sanctions were appropriate whether or not “preceded by less severe 
sanctions”), with Bass-Davis, 122 Nev. at 446, 449, 455, 134 P.3d at 105, 107-08, 111 
(reversing for failure to give an adverse inference instruction where a videotape was lost 
without being copied and noting that in that circumstance an adverse inference instruction 
is appropriate to “‘restor[e] the evidentiary balance’” (quoting Turner v. Hudson Transit 
Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 75 (S.D.N.Y. 1991))).[8]  Although the court offered Thomas 
a continuance so she could pursue discovery into the lost original and whether it might 
have varied from the electronic and other copies available, Thomas rejected this option.  
Cf. DesRosiers v. Moran, 949 F.2d 15, 22 (1st Cir. 1991) (declining to reverse order 
denying sanctions when the proponent elected to proceed to trial).  Under these 
circumstances, the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Thomas to 
introduce evidence of WMC’s negligent loss of the original chart but finding that more 
severe sanctions were unwarranted because waived. 
D.  Expert testimony/recall bias 
            Thomas’s final assignment of trial error concerns the general “recall bias” 
testimony presented by WMC’s expert, Edward Panacek, M.D., M.P.H.[9]  We reject this 
claim of error for two reasons.  First, Thomas makes a different objection on appeal than 
the one she made—indeed, prevailed on—at trial.  Second, even if error occurred in 
connection with Dr. Panacek’s general testimony about recall bias, it does not rise to the 
level required to reverse. 
            “‘Recall bias’ refers to the human tendency, when confronted with [a] rare 
outcome, such as the development of autism [after a child is vaccinated], to recall with 
greater frequency or clarity events which may explain the outcome.”  Hendrix v. Evenflo 
Co., Inc., 255 F.R.D. 568, 601 n.62 (N.D. Fla. 2009).  While expert testimony on recall 
bias has been permitted in the context of epidemiological challenges to the validity of 
retrospective public health studies, see Colon v. Abbott Laboratories, 397 F. Supp. 2d 
405, 409-10 (E.D.N.Y. 2005), we have found no published case approving its admission 
on individual witness credibility, and Nichols v. American National Insurance Co., 154 
F.3d 875, 882-83 (8th Cir. 1998), persuades us that such use of recall bias testimony 
invades the province of the jury and seems unhelpful.[10]  We thus decline respondents’ 
invitation to equate recall bias testimony with the cross-cultural eyewitness identification 
testimony we permitted in Echavarria v. State, 108 Nev. 734, 839 P.2d 589 (1992). 
            On appeal, Thomas objects to Dr. Panacek’s general testimony about recall bias 
on the grounds that it amounted to an improper, thinly veiled comment on her credibility 
as a witness.  Thomas’s problem is that she did not timely raise or preserve this objection 
in the trial court.  While Thomas mentioned recall bias in her omnibus motion in limine, 
she gave it just a single paragraph, stating “Dr. Panacek is a medical doctor and an expert 
in Emergency Room medicine [and h]e is not qualified to testify regarding a subject 
called ‘recall bias,’ which is not even subject to expert application.”  Fairly read, this 
objection went to Dr. Panacek’s qualifications to give recall bias testimony, not its 
helpfulness.  Because the trial court properly declined to give a definitive ruling on this 
sketchy objection (which appears invalid in any event—Dr. Panacek’s master’s in Public 
Health qualified him on recall bias, see supra note 9), the contemporaneous objection rule 
required Thomas to object at trial.  See Richmond v. State, 118 Nev. 924, 929-32, 59 
P.3d 1249, 1252-54 (2002); NRS 47.040(1). 
            Thomas did not renew her motion in limine or ask the court to exclude all 
testimony about recall bias before Dr. Panacek testified, as our dissenting colleague 
would find.  Before Dr. Panacek was called, Thomas reminded the court and opposing 
counsel that the section of her motion in limine concerning Dr. Panacek remained 
unresolved in several respects, recall bias being one.  She did not renew her motion in 
limine or ask for an order forbidding reference to recall bias.  Instead, Thomas 
affirmatively advised that she might well have no objections to Dr. Panacek being asked 
about recall bias, depending on what was asked and the foundation laid.  Per Thomas, 
WMC’s counsel “is a very experienced and skillful lawyer [who] knows how to phrase a 
question . . . we’re just going to have to wait and see whether the question occurs to any 
of us as being objectionable.  It may not be.” 
            On appeal Thomas challenges the district court’s admission of any testimony on 
the subject of recall bias.  But as noted, this was not the objection in the omnibus motion 
in limine or in the colloquy that preceded Dr. Panacek’s testimony.  True to her stated 
position in the trial court, Thomas allowed Dr. Panacek to testify for five pages about 
recall bias, in general, and its application to epidemiology and bad medical outcomes, in 
particular, without objection.  It was only when Dr. Panacek was asked if he had “an 
opinion . . . to a reasonable medical probability that recall bias is involved” in this case 
that Thomas objected. 
            When Thomas finally objected, the court called a recess.  After the jury was 
excused, Thomas volunteered that she had made a deliberate, tactical decision not to 
object to the general recall bias testimony “because it’s general information that really 
isn’t anything that we all don’t know.”  Thomas stated that her objection was to Dr. 
Panacek tying recall bias to the facts in this case, which Thomas argued was more 
prejudicial than probative and a comment on Thomas’s credibility, invading the province 
of the jury.  The court sustained Thomas’s objection to the question asked before the 
recess—whether Dr. Panacek had an opinion about recall bias being involved in the case.  
However, the court stated that it would overrule the objection to recall bias testimony in 
general.  But this latter ruling was gratuitous because by then the general recall bias 
testimony had been admitted without objection and Thomas’s counsel had stated that he 
didn’t deem the general testimony harmful or even objectionable.  Following the break, 
defense counsel spent only two pages on recall bias and covered nothing that hadn’t 
already been covered without objection in greater detail before the break. 
            NRS 47.040(1)(a) requires a party who objects to the admission of evidence to 
make “a timely objection or motion to strike . . . , stating the specific ground of 
objection.”  The “failure to specifically object on the grounds urged on appeal preclude[s] 
appellate consideration on the grounds not raised below.”  Pantano v. State, 122 Nev. 
782, 795 n.28, 138 P.3d 477, 486 n.28 (2006).  “This rule is more than a formality,” since 
an objection educates both the trial court and the opposing party, who is entitled to revise 
course according to the objections made.  1 Stephen A. Saltzburg, Michael M. Martin & 
Daniel J. Capra, Federal Rules of Evidence Manual § 103.02[9], at 103-18 (9th ed. 
2006).  Where, as here, an objection was stated as to certain evidence but not to other 
related evidence, and this was confirmed on the record to be the product of deliberate 
choice, “[t]here is no reason . . . to allow reconsideration of this strategic choice on 
appeal.”  Id. 
            We agree with the dissent that it can be argued that there isn’t much difference 
between general questions about recall bias and the question that would have tied the 
concept to this case directly.  See Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 118-19, 734 P.2d 
705, 709 (1987).  That argument is off limits to Thomas here, though, given her failure to 
timely object to the testimony about recall bias in general, her lawyer’s affirmation that 
such a difference did exist and was the crux of the matter, and the frank, on-the-record 
acknowledgment that the effect of the general recall bias testimony was negligible. 
 Certainly, on this record, the error in allowing the general testimony about recall bias 
cannot qualify as plain.  See Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 1, 16, 174 P.3d 970, 980 (2008); 
NRS 47.040(2); see also United States v. Yu-Leung, 51 F.3d 1116, 1121-22 (2d Cir. 
1995) (a decision not to raise an objection for strategic reasons amounts to waiver, not 
merely forfeiture, and is not reviewable even for plain error) (discussing United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)).[11] 
E.  Dismissal of Brandi Thomas’s claims 
            The district court dismissed the amended complaint naming Brandi Thomas as an 
additional party plaintiff based on the statute of limitations in NRS 41A.097(4).  On 
appeal, Brandi Thomas seeks to challenge the dismissal on constitutional and “relation 
back” grounds.  The district court did not address either challenge, because they weren’t 
raised until a motion for reconsideration was filed.  Citing Moore v. City of Las Vegas, 
92 Nev. 402, 405, 551 P.2d 244, 246 (1976), the district court denied reconsideration 
because this was not one of the “rare instances in which new issues of fact or law are 
raised supporting a ruling contrary to the ruling already reached.”  Since the district court 
denied the motion for reconsideration for procedural reasons and not on its merits, Arnold 
v. Kip, 123 Nev. 410, 168 P.3d 1050 (2007), is not of help.  And, while we have reached 
constitutional issues not addressed by the district court, Barrett v. Baird, 111 Nev. 1496, 
1500, 908 P.2d 689, 693 (1995), overruled on other grounds by Lioce v. Cohen, 124 Nev. 
1, 174 P.3d 970 (2008), it does not appear appropriate to do so in this case. 
            We therefore affirm. 
  
PARRAGUIRRE, C.J., and HARDESTY, DOUGLAS, SAITTA, and GIBBONS, JJ., 
concur. 
  
**********FOOTNOTES********** 
[1]        After copying the original chart at Bobbie Thomas’s request and consulting it to 
answer interrogatories, WMC lost the original of Ray Thomas’s emergency room chart.  
This became the basis for the sanctions proceedings that are discussed infra, at section 
II.C. 
[2]        “Keep Our Doctors in Nevada” or “KODIN” refers to a ballot initiative (the 
parties use referendum and initiative interchangeably, although initiative is the correct 
term) that voters passed in 2004 to limit  medical malpractice claims.  The initiative’s 
changes to Nevada’s medical malpractice law are codified in NRS Chapter 41A. 
[3]        We reject respondents’ argument that the “invited error” doctrine bars Thomas’s 
voir dire challenge.  Thomas acted promptly to disabuse WMC and Dr. Hardwick of any 
misconception they had as to the intended scope of her motion in limine, and the district 
court went on to address Thomas’s concern with having the blanket order in limine she 
had requested apply to voir dire.  This distinguishes “invited error” cases like Pearson v. 
Pearson, 110 Nev. 293, 871 P.2d 343 (1994), in which the invited error was not timely 
and forthrightly corrected in the trial court. 
[4]        NRS 49.315 provides, “Every person has a privilege to refuse to disclose the 
tenor of his vote at a political election conducted by secret ballot unless the vote was cast 
illegally.”  Potential jurors do not surrender their rights as citizens on receipt of a 
summons calling them to jury duty.  Even in an election law case, “[i]nquiry about 
political opinions and associations” has been held off limits unless “the particular juror 
had given some reason to believe, by his conduct or declarations, that he would regard 
the case as involving the interests of political parties rather than the enforcement of the 
law.” 2 Charles Alan Wright, Federal Practice and Procedure § 382, at 513-14 (3d ed. 
2000) (discussing Connors v. United States, 158 U.S. 408 (1895)). 
[5]        We decline to adopt the rule stated in Landon v. Zorn, 884 A.2d 142 (Md. 2005), 
abrogated on other grounds by McQuitty v. Spangler, 976 A.2d 1020 (Md. 2009), on 
which WMC and Dr. Hardwick rely.  Maryland follows a different approach to attorney 
voir dire than Nevada.  In Maryland, attorney voir dire is limited to establishing bases for 
challenges for cause; “‘it does not encompass asking questions designed to elicit 
information in aid of deciding on peremptory challenges.’”  Id. at 147 (quoting Couser v. 
State, 383 A.2d 389, 397 (Md. 1978)).  Nevada recognizes that attorney voir dire 
legitimately informs a party’s peremptory challenges.  Whitlock, 104 Nev. at 28, 752 
P.2d at 212-13. 
[6]        Thomas did not submit any literature, initiative materials, or ads the jury may 
have been exposed to.  The defense argued that the ballot initiative predated the trial by 
two years and people likely had no current memory of it.  Without any concrete examples 
or proof—and no transcript of voir dire—the court has no way to assess the venire’s 
exposure to tort reform literature except anecdotally. 
[7]        Although NRS 48.059(1) replicates Fed. R. Evid. 406, Nevada added subsection 
2 from the draft Model Rules, which the Federal Rules omit.  NRS 48.059(2) provides, 
“Habit or routine practice may be proved by testimony in the form of an opinion or by 
specific instances of conduct sufficient in number to warrant a finding that the habit 
existed or that the practice was routine.” 
[8]        Thomas also argues that the district court should have sanctioned WMC for its 
inability to produce a signed AMA release.  However, unlike the chart, there was no 
evidence the AMA release ever existed in signed form. 
[9]        Dr. Panecek was designated primarily as an expert on emergency room medicine, 
a subject in which he is board certified and teaches.  He also holds a Master’s Degree in 
Public Health, with a subspecialty in epidemiology, which he also teaches.  “Recall bias” 
is germane to epidemiology. 
[10]      Applying Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 
(1993), Nichols also concludes such testimony is neither reliable nor relevant and 
therefore inadmissible as expert testimony.  Although Higgs v. State, 126 Nev. ___, ___, 
222 P.3d 648, 658 (2010), adopts a more deferential and flexible standard than Nichols 
did in applying Daubert, it appears doubtful that “recall bias” testimony qualifies as 
providing “assistance” under Higgs. 
[11]      Even crediting arguendo the dissent’s finding of preserved error as to the general 
recall bias testimony, we cannot agree that the error “so substantially affected 
[appellant’s] rights that it could be reasonably assumed that if it were not for the alleged 
error[ ], a different result might reasonably have been expected,” which is required to 
prevail on harmless error review.  El Cortez Hotel, Inc. v. Coburn, 87 Nev. 209, 213, 484 
P.2d 1089, 1091 (1971).  Reason to question Thomas’s memory of the emergency room 
visit existed separate and apart from Dr. Panacek’s recall bias testimony, in her testimony 
that aspirin wasn’t administered when the record shows it was and her deposition 
testimony that she wasn’t given papers to take home which she later located and 
produced.  See 21 C. Wright & K. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure: Evidence 
§ 5035.2, at 630-34 (2d ed. 2005) (that evidence is cumulative of other properly admitted 
evidence suggests the error may be harmless).  Given Thomas’s trial court admission that 
the general recall bias testimony was “information that really isn’t anything that we all 
don’t know” and the weight of the other evidence favoring the jury’s finding of no 
negligence, we find the error, even if preserved, to have been harmless. 
***************************** 
CHERRY, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part: 
            The majority rejects Thomas’s argument that the district court materially 
prejudiced her case by allowing any testimony regarding so-called recall bias, concluding 
that Thomas did not object to the recall bias testimony proffered and that, at any rate, the 
district court’s error in allowing the testimony was harmless.  But in so concluding, the 
majority gives short shrift to the nature of recall bias evidence in the context of this case, 
where only Thomas’s credibility was implicated by the recall bias testimony, and the 
record of Thomas’s repeated objections to any such testimony.  I would reverse the 
district court’s judgment based on this issue, and thus, I dissent from that aspect of the 
majority’s decision. 
            As the majority notes, recall bias is typically implicated in large-scale research 
studies.  For instance, in a study of the effects of a certain pharmaceutical drug on a 
particular segment of the population, recall bias refers to the tendency of research 
subjects who experience a negative outcome such as cancer or a birth defect to “recall,” 
inaccurately, that they have been exposed at an earlier time to a suspected or known 
causal factor of the outcome.  As one magazine article appended to a federal court of 
appeals opinion noted with regard to studies of the connection, if any, between a prenatal 
pharmaceutical and birth defects, “[w]omen with normal babies may forget they took the 
drug and those with malformed babies may be more likely to remember—or vice versa.  
The bias is essentially unmeasureable.”  McBride v. Merrell Dow and Pharmaceuticals 
Inc., 717 F.2d 1460, 1468 (D.C. Cir. 1983).  The implication is that research subjects who 
experience a negative outcome may be unreliable with regard to whether they were 
exposed to a suspected causal factor.  While the notion of recall bias might be useful in 
assessing the validity of large-scale research studies, applying it to an individual 
impermissibly invades the jury’s role of evaluating witness credibility. 
            When, as here, liability turns on a single witness’s credibility, allowing recall bias 
testimony effectively constitutes permitting an expert to assess the individual witness’s 
credibility, the result of which likely is a different verdict than reasonably might have 
been expected if the testimony had been precluded.  See El Cortez Hotel, Inc. v. Coburn, 
87 Nev. 209, 213, 484 P.2d 1089, 1091 (1971).  Since Thomas offered the primary 
testimony as to causation in this case, Dr. Panacek’s recall bias testimony, even though 
stated in general terms, amounted to testifying as to Thomas’s credibility.  That is, 
because only Thomas experienced a negative outcome—specifically, her husband’s 
death—the recall bias theory discussed by Dr. Panacek necessarily must have been 
connected to Thomas’s testimony as to this fundamental issue, suggesting that her 
testimony was not credible.  The majority agrees that there is little difference between 
general questions about recall bias and the question that would have tied the concept 
directly to this case, ante at 22 (citing Townsend v. State, 103 Nev. 113, 118-19, 734 P.2d 
705, 709 (1987)), but refuses to address the problem because the majority believes 
Thomas failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to Dr. Panacek’s recall bias 
testimony. 
            But Thomas objected to such evidence at least four times before the district court 
decided to address the issue, and a fifth time during the same colloquy out of which the 
majority selects two statements to conclude that Thomas waived any objection.  Thomas 
first objected to all recall bias testimony through a motion in limine to exclude any such 
testimony from being offered at trial.  The majority dismisses the motion-in-limine 
objection as merely objecting to Dr. Panacek’s qualifications to give recall bias 
testimony, not to recall bias testimony itself.  But the majority ignores the import of 
Thomas’s motion-in-limine argument that recall bias “is not even subject to expert 
application”—an objection, not to Dr. Panacek’s qualifications, but to the general subject 
of recall bias.  Indeed, Thomas supported her statement with a citation to Santillanes v. 
State, 104 Nev. 699, 765 P.2d 1147 (1988), in which this court recognized that the 
admissibility of scientific evidence depends on its trustworthiness and reliability, 
indicating that Thomas questioned the substance of recall bias evidence.  Undoubtedly, 
then, Thomas was objecting to the admission of any recall bias testimony based on lack 
of reliability and trustworthiness, not based on Dr. Panacek’s qualifications to testify 
about it, as the majority contends. 
            The district court deferred ruling on that aspect of Thomas’s motion in limine 
until the pretrial conference.  At the pretrial conference, Thomas again objected to the 
presentation of any recall bias testimony, but the district court deferred ruling on the 
objection until trial.  At trial, just before Dr. Panacek was called to testify, Thomas 
objected a third time.  On the district court’s inquiry as to any outstanding motion-in-
limine issues regarding Dr. Panacek, Thomas reminded the court that it had yet to rule 
regarding “the recall bias testimony of Dr. Panacek” and his correspondingly 
“speculating on [Thomas’s] state of mind” at the time of the events at issue.  The district 
court again deferred ruling on the issue, explaining that it needed to first hear the 
testimony.  When Dr. Panacek began his testimony regarding recall bias, Thomas did not 
raise her fourth objection until respondents asked Dr. Panacek whether recall bias was a 
factor in this case.  A colloquy outside of the jury’s presence followed, during which the 
district court sustained Thomas’s objection to Dr. Panacek tying recall bias to Thomas, 
but overruled her objection to Dr. Panacek’s more general recall bias testimony. 
            In the face of Thomas’s numerous objections to any recall bias testimony, the 
majority nonetheless affirms based on two statements that Thomas made.  First, during 
Thomas’s third objection, when Thomas objected during trial, just before Dr. Panacek 
testified, she stated that she would “wait and see” whether the questions posed to Dr. 
Panacek were objectionable.  Second, during the colloquy after Thomas’s fourth 
objection to any recall bias testimony, Thomas offered that she intentionally did not 
object at the time Dr. Panacek began to testify regarding recall bias testimony because 
she did not find general recall bias testimony objectionable.  But the majority fails to 
mention that moments later, during that same colloquy, Thomas made a fifth objection to 
any recall bias testimony being offered, stating that because “only plaintiffs have any 
recall in this case[, e]ven the general information is prejudicial [and] without probative 
value.” 
            And regardless of the two statements on which the majority relies, Thomas’s third 
objection, raised before Dr. Panacek began testifying, certainly constitutes the 
contemporaneous objection necessary to preserve this issue for appeal.  See Richmond v. 
State, 118 Nev. 924, 929-32, 59 P.3d 1249, 1252-54 (2002).  After the district court 
deferred ruling on Thomas’s objection as to the admissibility of recall bias testimony a 
third time, explaining that it needed to first hear the testimony, the district court was at 
least implicitly, if not explicitly, ruling that it would admit general testimony regarding 
recall bias.  Given that the district court repeatedly refused to rule on Thomas’s 
objections until finally deciding the issue during the colloquy, it is unclear what else 
Thomas could have done without alienating the jury.  See Bocher v. Glass, 874 So. 2d 
701, 704 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing that counsel risks alienating the jury 
with repeated objections).  Even the district court was convinced that the objection had 
been preserved, as evidenced by the district court assuring Thomas that she had, in fact, 
preserved for appeal her objection to the recall bias testimony.  Considered along with 
Thomas’s first four objections, the record demonstrates that Thomas sufficiently 
preserved the issue despite the two inconsistent statements made during her third and 
fourth objections to recall bias testimony. 
            The majority fails to appreciate the substantial prejudicial effect of permitting 
even general recall bias testimony that directly implicated Thomas’s right to have a jury 
resolve the issue of her credibility and correspondingly declines to discuss that issue 
based on an incomplete analysis of the extent to which Thomas attempted to preclude any 
recall bias testimony from the trial and preserve the issue for appeal; I therefore 
respectfully dissent from that portion of the majority’s decision concluding that Thomas 
failed to preserve the admissibility issue for appeal and that, even if she had, allowing the 
recall bias testimony was merely harmless error.  Had the district court properly 
precluded the presentation of this recall bias testimony, a different result reasonably 
might have been reached and the judgment should thus be reversed. 
            The district court abused its discretion by allowing any testimony whatsoever 
regarding recall bias.  The correct and prudent action would have been to disallow any 
and all testimony concerning recall bias because such testimony, whether generally 
presented or specifically related to this case, in which only Thomas’s credibility was at 
issue, invades the province of the jury and is definitely prejudicial.  In light of the above, 
I respectfully dissent and would award Thomas a new trial free of any mention of recall 
bias. 
 
